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Summary 
The international legal system has weathered sweeping changes during last 
decades as new actors have appeared in international system. Private 
Military Security Companies (PMSCs) are one example of the most 
prominent shifts occurred in the context of laws of war with International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) being part of it. Traditionally IHL has been 
recognized as a body of law regulating the relationships between states or 
organized armed groups that shared some hierarchical, territorial and 
administrative characteristics of states. Holding such characteristics made 
these public actors distinctive from the private actors and drew a line 
between public and private. However, the improvement of the transnational 
trade and furtherance of globalization, together with the economic and 
political climate after the Cold War brought about an idea of outsourcing 
some activities previously undertaken exclusively by states. In such a 
context, new actors have raised and operated within international realm that 
blurred the said traditional line between public and private and brought up 
doubts on how these new actors could be addressed by IHL. I have 
evaluated the actual capacity of IHL in accommodating PMSCs. In doing 
so, I have uncovered a dilemma within IHL when it comes to address the 
PMSCs. Further, I suggest that this dilemma informs us of what I call a 
broader self-challenge within the regime of IL; a self-challenge to perceive 
statehood and to configure the public and private. I suggest that the 
normalization of the existence and operation of PMSCs discloses a shift in 
international legal rhetoric when it comes to accommodate non-state actors 
 2 
and it can be translated as a call to go beyond state-centrism as well as a 
dilution of the state and rhetoric of sovereignty.  
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1. Theory, Methodology, Research Questions and Delimitation 
 
1.1. Theory: 
It was in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that the idea of sovereignty was 
turned into a doctrine of statehood and law for the first time. Sovereignty 
was introduced as a “centralized power that exercised its lawmaking and 
law-enforcing authority within a certain territory”1. Based on a Weberian 
understanding of the modern state, under IL, statehood was defined as “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory”2. This image constitutes the 
basis of the so-called realist perspective in international relations
3
. 
According to the realist notion, statehood was relied on as the foundation of 
IL and states became the primary actors in the international system
4
. While 
originally, statehood was deemed as the material condition of certain 
political entities deciding to interact with each other through certain ways of 
IL, statehood is now a term defined by IL through particular criteria and can 
be conferred to particular entities satisfying those criteria
5
. Nonetheless, 
once an entity has achieved legal personality as a state, it becomes, in the 
realist notion of it, the primary unit of authority under IL; states have the 
power to determine what may or may not be included in/excluded from IL. 
                                                 
1
 Hans Morgenthau (1973: 306), Cited by Kyle M Ballard, “The Privatization of Military 
Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry”, in, Jäger, 
Thomas. & Kümmel, Gerhard. (ed.), Private military and security companies: chances, 
problems, pitfalls and prospects, 1. Aufl., VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 
2007, p. 38 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Colin Warbrick, States and Recognition in International Law, in Evans, Malcolm David 
(red.), International law, 2. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. p. 218. 
5
 Ibid. 
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Therefore, following this state-centrist logic, even where IL is dealing with 
something other than states, that is because of the intention of the states 
using IL is to establish other rules to bring about certain changes
6
; One such 
change is the acknowledgement of the legitimate and legal character of 
certain non-state actors under IL – PMSCs being one such example. 
Following this realist notion in realm of laws of the war, IHL is traditionally 
recognized as a body of law regulating the relationships between states or 
organized armed groups that shared some hierarchical, territorial and 
administrative characteristics of states. Holding such characteristics made 
these public actors distinctive from the private actors and drew a line 
between public and private. However, the improvement of the transnational 
trade and furtherance of globalization, together with the economic and 
political climate after the Cold War brought about an idea of outsourcing 
some activities that had been previously undertaken exclusively by states. In 
such a context, PMSCs have raised and blurred the said traditional line 
between public and private and brought up doubts on how these new actors 
could be addressed by IL. This is because PMSCs are at odds with the said 
Weberian understanding of statehood within the realist model of 
international politics. By running a global market trading in armed force, 
PMSCs challenge the core exclusive authority of state that is the exercise of 
the legitimate physical force and control over the territory. PMSCs’ 
inconsistency with the Westphalian system of sovereignty and statehood in 
IL is explained by considering a chain of premises; a) if one of the essential 
factors for defining state as a person of IL is the fact that the state should 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
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posses government
7
 and b) if the principal criteria for recognition of 
government is ultimately “effectiveness” of power within the state8 and c) if 
“governmental effectiveness understood as its power to assert a monopoly 
over the exercise of legitimate physical violence within the territory”9, then 
widespread use of PMSCs appear to challenge the governmental 
effectiveness and therefore, to jeopardize the ascendancy of the nation 
state.
10
 
 
1.2. Methodology, Research Questions and Outlines: 
Based on the above-mentioned theoretical framework, my thesis breaks 
down into three questions; the first, what PMSC is? the second, how PMSC 
is understood under IHL? and the third, what the existence of PMSCs means 
to IL as a system and what is the broader implication of the appearance and 
operation of PMSCs within IL?  
I have approached the first question as if I am discovering mere "facts". I 
have applied an interdisciplinary method to provide a holistic understanding 
of the subject. To do so, I have looked into economic, political and 
historical context from which PMSCs raised. (Section 2) 
                                                 
7
 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 provides 
that “ The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
8
 Matthew Craven, “Statehood, Self-Determination, And Recognition”, in Evans, Malcolm 
David (red.), International law, 3. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 224. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Martha Minow, “Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy”, in, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 
46, Issue 5, 2005, p.  1026. 
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Further, addressing the second and third question while referring to the 
already discussed facts, I have put forward my legal analyses. The legal 
analyses emphasises on investigating the phenomenon of PMSC within the 
regime of IHL, as it is defined within the realist notion of IL. (Section 3) 
Having in mind the Weberian definition of statehood, I have been doubtful 
in my analyses whether IHL -as a system traditionally regulating violence 
between states and/or organized armed groups that shared many of the 
territorial, administrative and “public” characteristics of states- have actual 
capacity to accommodate PMSCs. I have tired to show this state of 
hesitance by pointing out challenges and difficulties in regard to status 
determination of PMSCs' employee (Section 4) and defining their relation to 
the state actors within IHL (Section 5). Finally, I have tired to uncover how 
presence of PMSCs informs a new understanding of relationship between 
public and private within IHL, and more generally within the IL, which does 
not follow the traditional standards. (Section 6) 
After all, I have concluded that although it is possible to extend the rules of 
IHL to accommodate PMSCs, it will stretch the skin of IL so thin that it 
might eventually break. I have also concluded that certain changes in the jus 
in bello to accommodate PMSCs may inform of broader hidden shifts in 
configuring the relationship between the public and private realms in 
international society. This is an indication of what I call a self-challenge 
within the regime of IL when it comes to deal with non-state actors. I 
suggest that this self-challenge emanates from a gradual transition from the 
conventional Westphalian understanding of the state to submission of IL to 
an alternative understanding of the state; an alternative understanding of the 
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state which allows more space for participation and involvement of non-
state actors within international law. I take the example of PMSCs and put it 
in contrast to the case of mercenaries to show that how the normalization of 
the existence and operation of PMSCs discloses a shift in international legal 
rhetoric when it comes to accommodate non-state actors. This shift can be 
translated as a call to go beyond state-centrism as well as a dilution of the 
state and rhetoric of sovereignty. When states recognize private actors, such 
as in the case of PMSCs, as capable of legitimately entering into contracts 
with states and international organizations, the very same states which 
benefits from arguing a state-centrism provide a basis from which non-state 
actors within IL benefits; it serves to promote non-state actors’ potentials, as 
subjects of IL, beyond state centrism. 
The research is generally based on deskwork. Literature review and 
document analysis constitute the dominant source of data collection. In 
order to address the topic phenomena the paper contains large sources of 
academic writings and scholars’ publications in the realm of international 
law, politics of international law, international relations, economics and 
international political economic.  
 
1.3. Delimitation: 
The phenomena of PMSCs can be investigated from various entangles as the 
presence of these new actors have tied scholarships in economic, 
international relations, international political economy, globalization and 
international law. Indeed, one of the challenges in writing this thesis was to 
maintain coherency while taking an interdisciplinary approach to understand 
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PMSCs in a holistic manner. Only in the context of international law, the 
phenomena of PMSCs can be investigated under different regimes such as 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and 
international criminal law. Nonetheless, while I have tried to uphold a wide 
perspective to understand the fact of PMSCs, what I have highlighted in my 
analysis has been the discourse of international law, and more specifically, 
an inquiry to the orientation of IHL towards the raise and operation of 
PMSCs and their employees.   
 
 
*** 
 
2. Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) as New Actors in 
International Law (IL): 
 
2.1. What are the PMSCs? 
 
   One of the most prominent shifts occurred in the history of modern 
warfare has been the emergence of private companies forming a globalized 
and multi-dimensional industry which trades over military-security related 
services
11
. Composed of a complex division of labour, the private military-
security industry has appeared to be present in most conflict regions which 
occurred over the last two decades, from conflicts in Angola, Croatia, 
Ethiopia- Eritrea, Sierra Leone to more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                                 
11
 Aaron Ettinger, “Neoliberalism and the Rise of the Private Military Industry”, 
International Journal, Vol. 66, Issue 3, Summer 2011, p. 746 
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Just in Iraq, the enormous reliance on private contractors to undertake core 
military tasks led The Economists to call it the “first privatized war”12. Such 
wide-spread use of private military security companies (hereafter PMSCs) 
can depict a clear horizon concerning how significant the role of private 
contractors is in adjusting the power equivalences in modern conflicts
13
. 
To provide a concrete example indicating how decisive these private entities 
have been in conflict regions
14
, one can refer to Executive Outcomes 
(hereafter EO), a South African-based company which was established in 
1998 and staffed by the former personnel of South African Defence Force
15
. 
EO was contracted in Angola (1993) and Sierra Leone (1995) to contribute 
to bring the internal conflicts to the end, stabilize the region and restore the 
governments
16
.    
 In Angola, EO’s mission was assisting the Angolan government to confront 
a rebel army called National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) by training the government soldiers from September 1993 until 
January 1996.
17
 As a result of EO’s contribution, coinciding with the UN 
imposing international arms sanctions against UNITA
18
, the Angolan 
                                                 
12
 Military Industrial Complexities, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2003, at 56, mentioned at P.W. 
Singer, Essay, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law, Columbian Journal of Transnational Law (2004), p. 523. 
13
 Ibid., p.522 
14
 Christopher Kinsey, “Challenging international law: a dilemma of private security 
companies”, Conflict, Security & Development (2005) , p.270 
15
 David Shearer, outsourcing war, Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Autumn, 1998), p. 73 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 It refers to International sanctions imposed against UNITA on September 1993, 
following United Nations Security Council resolution 864 to condemn the deteriorating 
political, military and humanitarian situation in Angola. Available at:  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/unscr_864_150993.pdf 
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government was able to push UNITA into significant defeats
19
 and 
eventually forced it to come to the negotiating table
20
.   
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, in 1995, EO was contracted by the Sierra 
Leonean government to work with local civilian militia which, in turn, 
empowered the Sierra Leonean government to take the control over the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF was a rebel army founded by 
Foday Sankoh
21
, inspired by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and its 
success to overthrow the Liberian government
22
. 
More recent examples of PMSCs shifting the history of modern warfare can 
be found in the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these examples the 
warfare turned to be strikingly dependent upon private sector to the extent 
that a wide range of activities were handled by PMSCs: from housing and 
communication services to logistical support, intelligence gathering and 
weaponry maintenance
23
. To indicate how these wars contributed to a rapid 
expansion of the PMSC industry, one may consider the many companies 
operating in Iraq during and after the armed conflict, starting from 2003, 
such as Blackwaters – guarding officials and installations, supporting 
Coalition Forces and training Iraqi Army and Police – Triple Canopy  – 
providing security in Iraq and guarding Coalition Provisional Authority 
                                                 
19
 Shearer, supra note 15. 
20
 Kinsey, supra note 14. 
21
 Foday Saybana Sankoh was the founder and leader of the Revolutionary United Front 
who entered Sierra Leone in 1991 to launch a terror campaign within its territory. He was 
indicted on 7 March 2003 on 17 counts of crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. However, the indictment formally withdrew 
on December 2003 due to his death in custody of natural causes. , Prosecutor vs. Foday 
Saybana Sankoh, Special Court of Sierra Leone, available at: 
 http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/FodaySankoh/tabid/187/Default.aspx 
22
 Shearer, supra note 15. 
23
 Singer, supra note 12, pp. 522-523 
 14 
(CPA), – Vinnell  – working with, inter alia,  MPRI and SAIC as 
subcontractors to train new Iraqi army during 2003 – Dyncorp  – training 
Iraqi and Afghan Armies
24
 – Aegis Defence Services  – coordinating private 
security operations for US government in Iraq since mid-2004 – Kellogg, 
Brown & Root  – providing various supportive and logistic services 
essential for deployment and maintenance of US forces in Iraq)
25
 – and 
Titan Corp. and CACI International Inc. – translators and interrogation 
specialists at Abu-Ghraib Prison in Iraq.
26
  
Indeed, having regarded the enormous reliance on private contractors in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, by 2004 United States appeared to be the biggest client of 
private military-security industry
27
. According to the findings of the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan report, a US 
bipartisan congressional commission, it has been estimated that more than 
260,000 contractors were employed to support Defence, State and U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) operations during the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as of March 2010
28
. These operations include 
traditional military operation as well as civil society support operations of a 
                                                 
24
 Cusumano, Eugenio. "Outsourcing Military Training: The Role of Security Networks in 
Foreign Military Assistance" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Studies Association Annual Conference "Global Governance: Political Authority in 
Transition", Le Centre Sheraton Montreal Hotel, MONTREAL, QUEBEC, 
CANADA, March 2011, p.  16. 
25
 Ortiz, Carlos, “The Private Military Company: An Entity at the Center of Overlapping 
Spheres of Commercial Activity and Responsibility”, Jäger, Thomas. & Kümmel, Gerhard. 
(ed.), Private military and security companies: chances, problems, pitfalls and prospects, 1. 
Aufl., VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2007, page 56-57. 
26
 Imke-Ilse Drews , “Private Military Companies: The New Mercenaries? An International 
Law Analysis”, in, Jäger, Thomas. & Kümmel, Gerhard. (ed.), Private military and security 
companies: chances, problems, pitfalls and prospects, 1. Aufl., VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2007, pp. 338-339. 
27
 Singer, supra note 12, p. 521. 
28
 Transforming  Wartime Contracting; Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final report to 
Congress Findings and recommendations for legislative and policy changes by the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, p. 18-20, Available at: 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf 
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purely civilian nature. Though it is difficult to trace the accurate numbers in 
regard to the volumes of contracts or their respective contracting values, 
taking into account such estimated basis alone would make it evident that 
private sector has achieved a deep, wide and unprecedented presence within 
the US
29
. The unprecedented feature of private sector presence in US 
military becomes clear once one compares the ratio of PMSC involved in 
the so called Gulf War (1991) to the ratio of the same in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars; while in Gulf War the estimated ratio was one PMSC 
contractor to every fiftieth uniformed US soldier, during wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan the ratio had changed to one or two PMSC contractors to each 
uniformed US soldier
30
. This is indeed a remarkable expansion of PMSC 
presence taking place during only little more than ten years.   
The growth of the private military-security industry has sparked efforts to 
address the phenomenon within different academic disciplines
31
.  
Yet, despite increasingly public as well as scholarly debates about PMSCs 
and their significant presence in the zones of conflict in recent years, there is 
still ambiguity on the nature of such entities; there is no consensus on the 
very premises concerning what constitutes a PMSC.
32
 The causes of this 
state of non-consensus can be understood as twofold. First, the state of 
secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding activities of the PMSCs makes 
it difficult to conduct a clear analysis based on a coherent set of data and 
                                                 
29
 Caroline Holmqvist, “Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation”, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Policy Paper No. 9, January 2005, p. 24. 
30
 Singer, supra note 12, p. 523. 
31
 For example, “Thomson 1994; Arnold 1998; Zarate 1998; Cilliers and Mason 1999; 
Musah and Fayemi 2000; Nossal 2001; Mandel 2002; Singer 2003; Avant 2005; Leander 
2005; Kinsey 2006; Percy 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011” 
32
 Ortiz, supra note 25, at pp. 56-57. 
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evidences. Secondly, it is difficult to reach an agreement on how to define 
the PMSCs because these companies vary in different aspects including 
their “market, capitalization, number of personnel, firm history, corporate 
interrelationship, employee experience and characteristics, and even the 
geographic location of their home base and operational zones.”33 This state 
of dispersal within a single industry has led scholars to present different 
categorizations of PMSCs
34
.  
One common categorization is based on distinction between “private 
military companies” (PMCs) and “private security companies” (PSCs). 
Accordingly, while PMCs are designed to provide offensive services, PSCs 
are formed to offer defensive functions. This categorization which has also 
been referred to as “active versus passive”, however, could be problematic. 
The problem would mostly emanate from the fact that there is no clear line 
between offensive and defensive acts. Making such a distinction depends 
more on the context and circumstances surrounding the act rather than the 
intrinsic nature of the conduct. As an example in this regard, one can refer to 
the so called “Blackwater incident” in April 200435. Although the initial 
mandate for Blackwater’s contractors was to merely provide security for the 
US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Najaf, Iraq, Blackwater 
contractors engaged in one of the most violent battles in Iraq; they sent 
                                                 
33
 Singer, P. W., “Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry”, Updated 
ed., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2008, p. 88 
34
 Hansen, Joseph C., “Rethinking the Regulation of Private Military Security Companies 
Under International Humanitarian Law”, Fordham International Law Journal, Forthcoming, 
(July 2011), p.3., Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1895546 
35
 Daphné Richemond-Barak, Private Military Contractors and Combatancy Status Under 
International Humanitarian Law, Complementing IHL: Exploring the Need for Additional 
Norms To Govern Contemporary Conflict Situations, paper presented at International 
Conference, Jerusalem, June 1-3 2008, p. 4 
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helicopters to fight against insurgents who attacked the CPA and they 
picked up a wounded US Marine soldier – something that included 
ammunition drops
36
. These actions by Blackwater contractors amount, 
under IHL, to active participation in combat situations. The “Blackwater 
incident” indicates that what is considered offensive under certain 
circumstances easily can be interpreted as defensive under other 
circumstance and what is deemed to be a security function can turn into 
form a military act when the demands of the situation change.  
Moreover, when it comes to application of the laws of war there is no 
distinction between offensive and defensive acts since they both contain an 
act of violence
37
. This issue will be discussed in more detail later in section 
4 of this thesis.  
Another effort to define and categorize different PMSCs, known as “tip of 
the spear”, has been stipulated by Singer. According to this categorization, a 
distinction between the armed forces shall be based on their location in the 
battle space “in terms of level of impact, training, prestige, and so on”38. 
Having such basis in mind, three kinds of PMSCs can be recognized: 
military provider firms that focus on tactical environment providing services 
at front line of the battle space like actual fighting, direct commanding of 
force and control of field units
39
, military consultant firms that provide 
advisory and training services along side with strategic, operational and 
organizational analysis which is mostly necessary to efficiency of armed 
                                                 
36
 Holmqvist, supra note 29.  
37
 Article 49.1 of Protocol I defines “attacks” broadly to include “acts of violence against 
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” 
38
 Singer, supra note 33. 
39
 Ibid. 
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forces
40
, and military support firms that provide supplementary services 
“non-lethal” support such as logistic supports, technical supports and 
transportation
41
. 
Yet, this categorization is not empty of flaws on two accounts. First, the 
reality of most companies would not support such clear edged 
categorizations. Secondly, what has been presupposed in such categorization 
is the assumption that there is a direct correlation between proximity of the 
firm and its strategic impact, something which might not be true in all cases. 
For example, the strategic impact of instructing soldiers might be the same, 
if not more, as engagement in actual combat.
42
 
To avoid the problems of the categorizations presented above, I have 
adopted a cumulative approach to define PMSCs. Therefore, with an 
intention to indicate diversity within a unified kind of industry, in this thesis 
I refer to a certain terminology which is called “PMSC services spectrum”43. 
The PMSC service spectrum is defined as a continuum including so-called 
“private armies44” at one end and specialized non-military tasks, such as 
providing medical attention in conflict environments or undertaking 
                                                 
40
 For example Levdan, Vinnell, and MPRI 
41
 Singer, supra note 33. 
42
 Holmqvist, supra note 29, p. 5. 
43
 Ortiz, supra note 25. 
44By “private armies” the intention is to generally refer to those PMCSs which provide 
services that are commonly undertaken by armed forces or at least by the assistances of 
armed forces.  As examples, companies can be mentioned which are able “to deploy a force 
in an attempt to end a rebellion or restore a government to power, as the defunct Sandline 
International (Sandline) was contracted to do in Papua New Guinea and contributed to in 
Sierra Leone; to raise and maintain a degree of internal stability in conflict regions, as 
Executive Outcomes (EO), while active, succeeded in doing for some time in Angola and 
Sierra Leone; to upgrade to Western standards the military and security apparatuses of 
some states, as Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) accomplished in the 
Balkans; or to coordinate country-wide private security operations, as Aegis Defence 
Services (Aegis) has been doing for the United States (US) government in Iraq since mid-
2004, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR); wide-ranging supportive and logistic services 
essential for deployment and maintenance of US forces in conflict regions, such as the 
Balkans in the 1990s and Iraq”, Ibid. 
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transportation in the zones of hostility, on the other end. Thus, the services 
provided by PMSCs can be materialized both through the engagement in 
actual fighting as line units or direct control of the field units, on one hand, 
and delivering expert military training
45
 and other services such as logistics 
support, risk assessment, and intelligence gathering on the other hand. 
Therefore, instead of looking into different categories, PMSCs are being 
considered as constituting a continuum with two extreme ends as were just 
described while most PMSCs are mobile between those two ends. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the most recent attempts carried out 
to define PMSCs in two new documents, namely “Montreux Document on 
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during 
Armed Conflict”46 (hereafter the Montreux Document) and the “Draft 
International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of 
Private Military and Security Companies”47 (hereafter the Draft 
Convention), slightly but strikingly deviates from the above mentioned 
definition, which I use in this thesis, by avoiding to include the engagement 
in actual combat operations within the definition of PMSCs. Following a 
functional criteria approach, the Montreux Document has defined PMSCs as 
                                                 
45
 Singer, supra note 33, p. 92. 
46
 “Montreux Document” is the product of a joint initiative launched in January 2006 by the 
Government of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross in an attempt 
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University  (2009), Vol. 13 No. 3, 451–475 
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 “The Draft Convention” is consolidation of efforts taken to establish a more efficient 
regime to regulate PMSCs which was presented by the United Nations Working Group on 
Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating and Impeding the Exercise of Rights of 
Peoples to Self-Determination (“the Working Group”) to the 15th session of the Human 
Rights Council in Geneva held in July 2010.           
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“private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves”48. Military and security 
services are further defined as to include “armed guarding and protection of 
persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; 
maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and 
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel”49. However, 
what has been contentiously left untouched within the ambit of the 
definition is the issue of involvement of PMSCs in actual combat, what I 
previously mentioned as PMSCs functioning as “private armies”. Although, 
paragraph 26 of the Montreux Document recognizes the possibility for 
PMSCs’ personnel to be “incorporated into regular armed forces of a state” 
or to be qualified as “persons accompanying the armed forces” in terms of 
article 4A (4), there is no distinction in this regard between PMSCs and 
ordinary civilians
50
.  
The definition provided in Draft Convention is not much far from what has 
been included in the Montreux Document. Accordingly, a PMSC is defined 
in the Draft Convention as a legally established corporation providing 
military/security services, on a compensatory basis and through association 
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 Montreux Document, supra note 46, p. 453. 
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 Ibid. 
50
Indeed, the Montreux Document, though not explicitly, creates this impression that 
PMSCs conducting combat operations, other than what comes within the narrow limits of 
para. 26, could be qualified as taking direct participation in hostilities. Following this 
impression, considering that direct participation in hostilities is what could possibly fit 
within “civilian category” of IHL, the document concluded in para 26(b) that PMSCs’ 
personnel are protected as civilians under IHL. Reaching to such a conclusion, nonetheless, 
is not confident regarding the actual differences between civilians, as they are 
conventionally understood under the regime of IHL, and PMSCs. The status of PMSCs 
under the regime of IHL will be discussed further in Part 3. B. I. See Laurence Juma, 
“Privatisation, human rights and security: Reflections on the Draft International Convention 
on Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies”, 
Law, Democracy & Development , Vol. 15 (2011), p. 9.  
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of physical persons and legal entities which have a special authorization 
(license)
51
. 
Although the Draft Convention has tried to present a wider understanding of 
the role of PMSCs by addressing each of military services and security 
services in distinct sub-articles
52
, it shares the contentious aspect of 
definition with the Montreux Document, namely, to avoid mentioning 
“combat operation” while enlisting the examples of military services carried 
out by PMSCs. According to Article 2(b), (c) of the Montreux Document, 
“Military services refer to specialized services related to military  actions  
including strategic planning, intelligence, investigation, land, sea or air 
reconnaissance, flight operations of any type, manned or unmanned, satellite 
surveillance, military training and logistics, and material and technical 
support to armed forces, and other related activities”. Further, “Security 
services refer to armed guarding or protection of buildings, installations, 
property and people, police training, material and technical support to police 
forces, elaboration and implementation of informational security measures 
and other related activities.” 
However, the examples provided in the articles mentioned above do not 
constitute exhausting lists since although both documents call upon states 
not to contract out particular services which “could cause PMSC personnel 
to become involved in direct participation in hostilities”53, the Montreaux 
Document and Draft Convention both, ultimately, put it in the discretion of 
                                                 
51
 Art. 2, (a) and (b) 
52
 Laurence Juma, “Privatisation, human rights and security: Reflections on the Draft 
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Security Companies”, Law, Democracy & Development , Vol. 15 (2011), p. 10. 
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states to determine what services may or may not be contracted out to 
PMSCs
54
.  
 
The open-ended definitions found in the Montreaux Document and the Draft 
Convention have made me more confident to rely on the “PMSC services 
spectrum” terminology and cumulatively define PMSCs as legally 
established multinational commercial enterprises offering services that, 
although vary from supplementary and housing services to weaponry 
maintenance and military support, generally fall within the security-military 
domain and “involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic way and 
by military means and/or the transfer or enhancement of that potential to 
clients”55. 
Finally, it should be noted that in order to analyze the activities of PMSCs 
one has to go beyond the internal structure of these companies and take into 
account the important role of sub-contractors in putting the plan and policy 
of these companies into practice. The issue of sub-contracting will be 
elaborated later in this thesis. However, for now it suffices to mention that 
considerable amount of complexities surrounding the “dilemma” of PMSCs, 
particularly the difficulties with transparency, accountability and 
responsibility that will be discussed later, emanates from the practice of sub-
contracting within PMS industry.   
 
                                                 
54
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55
 Ortiz, supra note 25, p. 60 
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2.2. A Historical and Political Context: How did PMSCs come 
into existence? 
      
    In order to provide context for the discussions to follow, this section 
considers the rise of PMSCs. The rise of PMSCs is should be understood 
within the neoliberal market framework, taking into account the 
international integration caused by globalization and conditioning of the 
modern state by the political economic practices of neo-liberalism.
56
  
 
2.2.1. Neo-liberalism: 
By the mid 1980’s and in the wake of globalization, in the aftermath of the 
attempts undertaken for raising the state efficiency, a neo-liberalist
57
 wave 
of reform commenced in the arena of public management. It is difficult to 
find a unified definition of neo-liberalism since there is no agreement 
amongst the authoritative sources of the theory
58
. However, for the purpose 
of this thesis, neo-liberalism can be defined as “a theory in political 
economic practices that proposes that human well- being can be best 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade.
59” Relying on economism and marketism, as 
achieved by means of privatization, liberalization and deregulation, 
                                                 
56
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economic neo- liberalism then justifies the expansion of markets and the 
promotion of competition and formalism as opposed to the protectionism of 
the state and other bureaucratic agencies
60
.  Particularly, though not 
exclusively, within the US, neo-liberalism facilitated the creation of 
powerful private commercial entities driven by the objective of making 
profit
61
. In acquiescence with such climate, states have increasingly 
accepted the involvement of private companies in providing services which 
had been previously managed through the states’ monopoly of power.62 
Particularly in the context of armed conflict, such ideas of privatization and 
free trade promoted the desire to outsource the states’ military and security 
functions to some private companies. The effect of such military neo-
liberalism is, as I have pointed out above, most evident in the case of the US 
as exemplified in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these wars, for the first 
time in the modern war history, PMSCs undertook a wide range of activities 
including core tasks such as combat support and weaponry maintenance
63
. 
Thus, in order to understand the context from which PMSCs have risen, it is 
appropriate to explore the transformative interactions within the US policy 
which led to outsourcing governmental activities in general, together with 
tracing the peculiar effects of the ideology of neo-liberal economic on the 
US’ security governance.64 This has eventually led to an enormous reliance 
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on private contractors within the US military structure
65
 and sneaked into 
the international level through the globalization. 
 
2.2.2. Privatization: 
 
The Placement of neo-liberal ideology within the security policy in the US 
dates back to the post Cold War era which coincided with growing concerns 
on how bureaucratic features of the federal government decreased efficiency 
and caused waste and unmanageability to procure goods and services
66
. 
Having a big government
67
 was recognized as the cause of such inefficiency 
symptoms and the cure was already found to be applying neo-liberalism as 
an organizing policy principle
68
.  
Along with such a climate, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) was designed in 1985, as the first explicit administrative 
initiations to place private contractors within the US military structure
69
. 
The LOGCAP is a document that contains concepts, procedures and policies 
prescribing adequate use of private contractors to augment the US army 
force in “wartime conditions”70. This would be possible once military units 
focus on core operation activities and leave non-core tasks to private 
contractors. However, the LOGCAP has defined the “wartime conditions” 
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quite broad as to include a wide range of situations from “heightened 
international tensions or states of military readiness through periods of 
armed conflict up to and including a congressionally declared state of 
war.”71  
The call for bringing reforms was furthered by the Clinton Administration’s 
National Performance Review (NPR), today under the name National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPRG)
72
. The NPR/NPRG 
provides a scheme for redesigning of the federal government. The scheme 
contains transformation of the current government to the one that “works 
better and costs less”73. To operationalize the plan, initially, then Vice 
President Al Gore led a task force to investigate how to make “tangible 
improvements” in regard to the government’s services to the public. The 
outcome was a report called report of the National Performance Review, 
From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better & 
Costs Less (hereinafter Report)
74
. The report provided 384 major 
recommendations and together with 38 accompanying reports, 1,250 
specific actions were envisaged to save $108 billions over a five year period 
by reducing the number of overhead positions, in areas such as 
management, procurement, financial management, etc
75
. Further, the idea of 
reducing government costs derived to enactment of the US Federal 
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Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) in 1998. Accordingly, federal 
executive agencies were required to firstly conduct inquiries to identify so-
called “inherently governmental” activities, distinguish them from those 
activities which can be undertaken by private section and then conduct 
managed competitions between federal executive agencies and private 
sections to see who can perform the activities at best
76
.  
 
The idea of outsourcing government activities accelerated during the George 
W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)
77
. Following the same idea of 
reducing government’s function to those activities that it should and could 
do best, the Bush Administration introduced “The President’s Management 
Agenda” in 200178. The Agenda set three principles as guidelines for 
reforming the government. Accordingly, the government was required to be 
“citizen-centred” as opposed to bureaucracy-centring, “result-oriented” and 
“market-based” 79. Later on in the Agenda and in line with the “market-
based” principle, competitive outsourcing was identified as one 
management initiative designed to increase governmental efficiency.
80
  
Such an ascendancy of the neo-liberal economy ideology at the policy-
making level was encouraged by a growing US private sector lobbying for 
contracting activities previously preserved exclusively within the public 
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domain
81
. The harmony of such an orchestra gave rise to the projection of 
the concept of outsourcing the federal government’s activities within the 
US
82
. 
Following the kind of neo-liberal ideology explained above, outsourcing 
within the US is defined as referring to any decision made by the 
government in order to “purchase goods and services from sources outside 
of the affected government agency”83 and was seen as a mechanism to 
enhance governmental effectiveness by reducing its scope, size and 
expenditures
84
. Privatization is one result which, inter alia
85
, occurs when 
the government decides to outsource certain goods and services which were 
previously provided by the government itself
86
.  In regard to outsourcing of 
the military activities, such a climate has paved the way for extending the 
use of private contractors in war zones
87
.  
 
2.2.3. Global War on Terrorism: 
 
Particularly during the so-called Global War on Terrorism, following on the 
9/11 attacks in 2001, the rising concern for confronting with the so-called 
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“new war”88 along with the neo-liberal cost-efficient horizon, has given 
popularity to the idea of outsourcing the military and security services by 
the US. When referring to the “new war”, the term “new” is used to 
establish a distinction between traditional models of warfare which 
represents the Western stereotype about what waging war is on one hand, 
and on the other hand, what sounds unconventional to such a western 
perspective. Accordingly, while the “traditional” model of warfare has been 
described as “a contest between national armies in uniform trained and 
disciplined to fight to protect the national interests of a state”89, the “new 
war”, instead, emerges as being carried out by non-state actors such as rebel 
groups, militias, criminal gangs, terrorist groups and mercenaries
90
. For 
these “new war” actors, the goals of the war are less concerned with the 
national or sovereign’s interests, but rather “about identity or greed 
politics”91. 
Such politics, in turn, might be achieved through gaining ethnic priority or 
economic advantage over the other ethnic or social groups rather than 
through territorial gain
92
. Thus, contrary to the traditional picture of war, 
this “new war” would more appear as a local problem which should be 
handed to the local police to be solved
93
. This is at least how the majority of 
scholarly literature understands the “new war”.94 
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Furthermore, while traditional warfare is described as rational movements 
governed by set of rules known as the Laws of War – of which IHL is a part 
– the methods of the new war are perceived to be incapable of respecting the 
restraint in warfare
95
 including acts such as “murder, rape, intimidation, 
looting and brutality”, “along with the use of child soldiers and the total 
disregard for non-combatant status”96.  
Confronted with this type of “uncivilized” violence, after 9/11/2001 attack, 
the US adopted, inter alia, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 30 
September, 2001, (QDR) to set out the US approach toward this type of 
“new war”. Accordingly, the QDR lists seven strategic principles to enforce 
its defence policy on Global War on Terrorism, three of which hints upon 
the role of the private sector: (a) the focus on risk management, (b) the 
development of a capabilities-based approach, and (c) the transformation of 
the US military and defence establishment.
97
 The necessity for application 
of these principles emanates from the assumption that the challenges are 
constantly changing. Applying this assumption in regard to the risk 
management, one has to adequately understand future risks and be able to 
respond pre-emptively rather than merely relying on the earlier threat-based 
approaches according to which the focus is on available intelligence about a 
particular and identifiable adversary
98
. This function of responding at short 
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notice and with little institutional preparation is what assumed to be best 
performed by the private sector
99
.  
Similarly, the capabilities-based approach leaves behind the earlier 
questions, such as which actor (state or non-state) might pose the threat or at 
which place a confrontation would occur. Rather, the capabilities-approach 
focuses on how the adversary might fight
100
. Further, a capabilities-
approach demands a change in armed forces’ missions which would adjust 
to features of the “new war”, namely “surprise, deception and asymmetric 
warfare”101. That need for the transformation of the US military and defence 
establishment demanded a revolution in military affairs (RMA)
102
. 
However, large amounts of money were needed to restructure the military 
and develop new technologies. To fund the RMA, the US could choose 
either to reduce its global engagement or to rely on the private sector 
shouldering basic tasks and financial costs. Considering the security climate 
after 9/11 attack, the Bush Administration chose the second option. 
Consequently, by letting the private sector take charge of many basic tasks 
as well as the responsibility to invest for development of technologies and 
expertise, the US was able to save money and to free uniformed military to 
perform critical military skills
103
. Therefore, relying on PMSCs sounds as 
extremely cost-efficient for US
104
. However, beyond the monetary benefits, 
the use of the PMSCs in military-security domain has been compelling to 
the US also because it lessens the risk of being held responsible for probable 
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violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human 
rights law (IHR) while pursuing the national security goals
105
.  
 
*** 
 
3. Private Faces of Organized Violence; Comparing the Case of PMSCs 
to Mercenaries 
 
IHL is a body of law that applies to the situations of armed conflict. The 
laws of war – the larger and more encompassing notion of international law 
during armed conflict – has a long history, as old as the war itself. However, 
it was not until the nineteenth century that rules and principles of war were 
codified and shaped a written regime of law which was internationally 
applicable
106
. Many of these new codifications had a particular purpose to 
“humanize” warfare. What constitutes the legal sources of IHL includes the 
set of rules and regulations embodied in particular in Hague Conventions, 
Geneva Conventions I-IV (GC) and the Additional Protocol I-II (AP I-II)
107
, 
as well as customary international law (CIL)
 108
. In addition, there are other 
conventions and agreements serving as legal sources referring to specific 
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issues of warfare and the protection of legal assets during armed conflicts
109
. 
IHL applies to the situation of armed conflict, including both international 
armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). IAC, 
also including cases of partial or total military occupation
110
, exists when 
one state uses armed forces against another state
111
. NIAC, on the other 
hand, is defined as “a confrontation between the existing governmental 
authority and groups of persons subordinate to this authority or between 
different groups none of which acts on behalf of the government, which is 
carried out by force of arms within national territory and reaches the 
magnitude of an armed confrontation or civil war.
112” 
Considering this brief introduction, it can be said that the IHL is 
traditionally conceived as a system regulating violence between states 
and/or organized armed groups that shared many of the territorial, 
administrative and “public” characteristics of states. Then, when it comes to 
PMSCs, the question would be how IHL will accommodate this private face 
of organized violence. However, dealing with private organized violence is 
not without precedent in IHL. The most obvious example is the case of 
mercenaries and the question is what the final orientation of IHL was 
towards mercenaries. Relying on the conceptual heritage in IHL left form 
the European Code of Honour, soldiers fighting for money were 
dishonoured against the one who fought for the glory of God or defending 
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the honour of defenceless
113
. Based on such conceptual heritage, PMSCs 
have been called the new mercenaries by some critics. Accordingly, the 
plain image of being paid to fight has directed these critics to depict PMSCs 
in the same frame as the mercenaries and to suggest that these private 
entities should be considered as mercenary companies – as if the notion of 
the mercenary has just reappeared in a new garment
114
.  
Against such a background, PMSCs have tried to avoid being labelled as 
mercenary industries. Instead, they have tried to build their identities based 
on their differences from the outlawed mercenaries, something that will be 
discussed latter on in this thesis
115
. Such efforts by PMSCs, concomitant 
with the ascendancy of the neo-liberalism and its advocacy for a free 
market, in particular in the US as explained above, have been rather 
successful; they have helped produced an image of the PMSCs as legally 
established companies.
116
 
What will be investigated in the following is the status of PMSCs in relation 
to mercenaries; in what ways are they similar and in which sense do they 
differ, how creditable is the logic of assimilation or differentiation between 
PMSCs and mercenaries? And finally, what this comparison means to IL? 
In doing this, it is essential to have an introductory note on what is 
considered as Mercenarism.  
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3.1. Definition of Mercenaries 
 
One of the problems in IL in regard to addressing mercenaries is the 
difficulty in providing an appropriate definition of the latter. Nonetheless, 
the issue of involvement of private non-state actors in armed conflicts have 
been slightly touched upon by the international laws of war in the modern 
state system. 
The earliest codified international laws of war in the modern state system 
were the Hague Conventions that hinge upon a distinction between the 
private actions of individuals and what could influence interstate 
relations
117
. Accordingly, the 1907 Hague Convention on Neutral Powers 
and Persons in case of War on Land
118
 contains certain legal standards for 
neutral parties and persons in cases of war. However, when it comes to the 
participation of nationals of neutral states in hostilities there is, according to 
the Convention, no obligation imposed on the Member States to restrict 
their nationals from being hired by belligerents
119
. Fighting for foreign 
states would just cause nationals to loose their status as “Neutral” and be 
treated in the same way as the belligerents’ own forces120.  
However, further involvement of mercenaries in the fights against several 
nascent state regimes in Africa, together with their confrontation with the 
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UN in the course of UN Operation in Congo,1960–1964,121 alerted the  UN 
to adopt certain anti-mercenary measures, inter alia, the 1970 Declaration of 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (1970  Friendly Declaration). Accordingly, by condemning the 
practice of the use of mercenaries against movements for national liberation 
and independence, the 1970 Friendly Declaration called upon states to take 
measures for preventing the recruitment, financing and training of 
mercenaries in their territories and to prohibit their nationals from serving as 
mercenaries. However, the 1970 Declaration placed the burden of 
enforcement exclusively on the states. Considering that the states appeared 
often as unwilling, unable, or just uninterested in taking such measures, the 
Declaration were not very successful in confronting with mercenaries
122
. 
The legal efforts to confront private military actors furthered by adaptation 
of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts.  
 
3.1.1. The Definition of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions: 
 
In its Article 47, the Protocol prohibits the member states to grant 
mercenaries the right to be a combatant, and consequently the status and 
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privileges of a prisoner of war (POW). Further on, the Article defines 
mercenaries as including any person who; 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) Does, in fact, take part in the hostilities; 
(c) Is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain; 
(d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of a 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; 
(f) Has not been sent by a State, which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.” 
 
Yet, rigid restrictions set in the definition defeats the application of the 
Protocol I in the enforcement phase. The most problematic issue which 
causes such inefficiency is the required intent or motivation for the 
identification of mercenaries. First, it overlooks so-called “confessional 
mercenaries” who have religious intentions but also are economically 
compensated for their fights
123
. Moreover, relying on intent to raise criminal 
responsibility makes the convention unworkable; intent simply is too 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove. The intent requirement concerned has 
the key importance for identifying a person’s criminal status but there is no 
objective way to assert that the intent in a particular case is exclusively 
private gain – the one accused for being a mercenary can always claim that 
he/she had been pursuing other goals than a private gain.  That difficulty to 
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secure evidences aggravates when it comes to extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over nationals, especially in situation of armed conflict.
124
 
 Meanwhile, the general movement of condemning mercenaries has been 
pursued on a regional level – one of the most important of regional efforts at 
criminalization is the “Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in 
Africa” passed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1972.  
 
3.1.2. The Definition of the OAU Convention: 
 
Article 1 of the Convention defines mercenaries by referring to the purpose 
of their employment. Accordingly, a mercenary is defined to include 
everyone, not national of the state against which the action is directed, who 
is hired to overthrow or undermine the independence, territorial integrity of 
normal working of one of the OAU Member States or OAU-recognized 
liberation movements
125
. Further, in Article 2, a more strict position is taken 
against mercenaries by considering the acts of mercenaries to constitute 
crimes against the peace and security of Africa and punishable as such
126
. 
Despite such an aggressive position the ban against mercenaries is not 
absolute under the Convention. Rather, mercenarism is still allowed if the 
actor serves purposes other than what is set in Article 1, as far as his/her 
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action does not hurt the existence, maintenance or stability of one of 
governments or liberation movements endorsed by the OAU
127
. Hanging the 
criminality of the act upon the purpose of the actor is a direct result of a 
political bias pursued by the OAU, namely the intention to protect the 
Member States or its recognized movements rather than confronting 
mercenaries in general. Consequently, the Convention allows African 
governments to hire non-nationals, as long as they are used to defend the 
governments from “dissident groups within their own borders”. However, 
the use of mercenaries is forbidden once they turn to act against rebel 
groups which are endorsed by the OAU
128
. For example, as Singer points 
out, “the South African government, which was outside the OAU at the 
time, was legally prohibited from hiring foreigners to fight against Nelson 
Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC), a liberation movement that 
the OAU supported”129.  Finally, the lack of a real enforcement mechanism 
has rendered the Convention ineffective.      
Along with such regional efforts to combat mercenaries, the UN established 
the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries in 1989, pursuing a way to tackle the problems of 
previous documents.  
 
3.1.3. The Definition of the 1989 UN Convention: 
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Article 1 and 2 of the Convention defines mercenaries as any person who:  
“(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
(b)  Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the 
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or 
paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that 
party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a party to the conflict; 
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.”  
 
Also, the title of mercenary includes any person who qualifies the same 
requirements in any other situation that aims at overthrowing a government 
or undermining the constitutional order or territorial integrity of a state.  
Considering this definition, the Convention provides a more inclusive 
definition of mercenaries than the one set forth in Protocol I. Accordingly, 
the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries are declared as 
offensive in the 1989 Convention. Yet, the Convention was not successful in 
solving the legal confusion surrounding the definition of mercenaries.
130
 
Still, the requirements set out in the articles of the Convention are extremely 
difficult to be proved. Further, such restricted requirements narrow the 
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scope of the definition in a way that leaves hardly any room for applicability 
of the Convention
131
. Moreover, instead of emphasizing the nature of the act 
to identify the offence of mercenarism, criminal status is still hinged upon 
the intention of the actor; this brings about the same challenges in regard to 
the workability of definition as with Protocol I, already discussed above. 
Further, in regard to judicial competence, states have jurisdictions to deal 
with the crime of mercenarism under the Convention only if it is committed 
within the boundaries of a state or by a national of a state
132
. Finally, since 
the Convention does not provide any monitoring mechanism for its 
provisions, the enforcement of the Convention is still remained to the will, 
capability and interest of the individual member states
133
.   
 
 
3.2. Do PMSCs Differ from Mercenaries? 
 
Considering the ambiguities arising from the legal regulations discussed 
above, it is not surprising that PMSCs resort to precisely this ambiguity in 
order to establish arguments through which the PMSCs distinguish 
themselves from the outlawed mercenaries. To assess whether PMSCs can 
be actually recognized as mercenaries one has to return to the constitutive 
elements in the definition of mercenaries and evaluate to what extent the 
PMSCs fit within the said definition. To do so, I will look into the most 
recent definition set forth in the 1989 International Convention against the 
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Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and evaluate its 
applicability to the case of PMSCs.  
As in respect to the first requirement of Article 1 of the 1989 Convention, a 
difficulty rises while asserting the requirement of being “specially recruited 
locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict
134” to the case of 
PMSCs. This holds a two-edge concern. The first concern is the fact that it 
would rarely occur that the PMSCs’ contract is tied to one specific armed 
conflict or a definite region.
135
 Rather, most PMSCs’ employees are 
recruited on a multiple task basis, for a period of time, to provide demanded 
services without being tied to any specific conflict or conflict area
136
. 
Secondly, it does not often happen that a PMSC is being contracted with a 
specific purpose to fight. Instead, PMSCs undertake quite different range of 
activities, as I have expanded on above, including what may be inherently 
military in nature as well as technical and logistical supports, military 
consultancy and military training programs. 
As in regard to the second requirement, i.e. of being motivated by private 
gain, it has been argued that unlike mercenaries who are driven by 
individual profit, PMSCs are registered corporate entities, built on 
permanent business structures, which have assets and hold legal personality. 
Thus, what is received by PMSCs’ personals is business profit – rather than 
individual profit – which can be gained by following the companies’ 
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practices and policies
137
. Accordingly, the structures of PMSCs are settled 
in order to make PMSCs’ employees responsible to their superiors, bind the 
superiors by the content of the contracts and make the company superiors – 
and not the employees – liable before the clients, and not in relation to IL. 
With such structures, the PMSCs are said to be distinguished from 
mercenaries
138
. 
Further, concerning both the requirement of nationality and the relation with 
the state armed forces
139
, one obstacle for applying the definition to the case 
of PMSCs is that while mercenaries are defined to be foreign individuals not 
belonging to the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, PMSCs’ employees 
can be integrated into the armed forces of the states involved in the conflict. 
To mention an example, one can refer to the Sandline International in its 
contract with Papua New Guinea in 1997. Through that contract, Sandline 
was mandated to help the government to confront a rebel group. However, 
to avoid being labelled as mercenaries, the government deputized them 
under the title of “special constables” even though they were considered as 
foreigners
140
. Yet, to avoid being labelled as mercenaries, it is also likely 
that PMSCs’ employees well be granted the citizenship141. This is often the 
case in respect to weaker states which are dependent upon the help of 
PMSCs to bring about stability in the conflict region. 
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3.3. Conclusion; The Implication of Differentiation from 
Mercenaries 
 
The arguments, which were already mentioned, to distance PMSCs from the 
illegitimate mercenaries, not only inform us to consider PMSCs 
independently as a new face of organized private violence but also, it 
unmasks a developmental process in which states and international 
community have changed their orientation towards organization of private 
violence. Taking into account the neo-liberal context of IL, that was 
explained earlier, from which PMSCs have raised, one can see how states 
and international community showed flexibility to accommodate this new 
face of organized private violence as legitimate and normal whereas it was 
not the case in regard to the similar entity of mercenaries. Otherwise, one 
could even say that whole these differentiations with mercenaries do not 
necessarily imply the legitimacy of PMSCs. The fact is that the difficulties 
mentioned above are not exclusive to the case of PMSCs. Therefore, they do 
not provide sufficient grounds for distinguishing PMSCs from the 
mercenaries. If there are challenges to accommodate PMSCs within the 
definition provided in the documents explained above, it is not necessarily 
an indicator of their distinction from very similar entities of mercenaries. 
Rather, it should be considered as the shortcomings of such a definition and 
the problem of loose (legal) formulations of who a mercenary is. As is 
discussed earlier, these shortcomings have rendered the different 
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conventions and declarations unworkable even in regard to the mercenaries 
themselves
142
.  
 
*** 
 
4. PMSCs and Status Determination Dilemma under the IHL 
 
4.1. Overview: 
 
One important categorization which IHL, along with the general laws of war 
emphasises, it is the very fundamental principle of a distinction between 
combatants and civilians, as well as between military objectives and civilian 
objectives
143
. This key distinction determines the international legal status 
of the two categories of people and objects. In the event of an IAC, these 
statuses indicate the primary status of the persons or properties which in 
turn, determines the protection afforded to them as well as legal 
consequences of their conducts
144
. Accordingly, military force can be 
legitimately directed against combatants and military objects whereas 
civilians and civilian objects are protected from being lawfully military 
targeted.
145
 Being recognized as a combatant, the person is granted with 
particular rights and entitlements which are called the “combatant’s 
privileges”. These privileges include the licence to conduct hostilities146, 
                                                 
142
 Singer, supra note 12, p. 532. 
143
 Ipsen, supra note 109, p. 79. 
144
 Ibid. 
145
 Article 48, 49, para.1, 51, para. 2 and 6, 53, 54 para. 4, 55 para. 2, 56 para. 4 AP I. 
146
 Article 3 Hague Regulations.; Article 43, para. 2 AP I. 
 46 
enjoying immunity from prosecution under domestic law for such actions – 
as far as these acts are in compliance with IHL,
147
 as well as a right to be 
rewarded POW status and protection under the third Geneva Convention if 
or when captured by the adversary
148
.  
A civilian, on the other hand, is prohibited from direct participation in 
hostilities (DPH) – or else she/he loses the right to protection against the 
effect of the hostilities for the duration of each specific act
149
. Also, if she/ 
he acts in a conduct of hostility like killing an adversary soldier, she/ he can 
be prosecuted for the crime of murder as defined under domestic law
150
. 
Contrary to the combatants, when captured, civilians are not entitled to 
POW status
151
 although they enjoy other protections while in detention
152
 
and may be granted the same treatment as POWs by the detaining power
153
.  
In regard to NIAC in general, the source of reference is the common Article 
3 GC I-IV, which provides a minimum protection standard for the victims of 
conflicts, and AP II wherein those standards are elaborated
154
. Apart from 
the treaty sources already mentioned here, laws and regulations on NIACs 
are nourished by a growing body of customary law. According to these 
customary principles, defined by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in its large project on customary IHL
155
, most of the standards and 
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fundamental protections provided in the GC’s and AP I-II for civilians are 
applicable also in the situation of a NIAC
156
. Accordingly, during IACs as 
well as NIACs civilians should be distinguished from persons involved in 
the conflict as DPHs or combatants. Following such a distinction, the armed 
forces of the state, as well as any other non-state party involved in a NIAC, 
shall not direct military attacks or other acts of violence against civilians
157
.    
 
Thus, there are three main reasons that make it essential to determine if 
PMSCs’ employees shall be considered as combatants or civilians. The first 
reason is to know if they can take direct participation in hostilities – DPH – 
without therefore losing a status whereby they are protected. The second 
reason, which derives from the first, is to see whether they may be 
prosecuted for acts of hostilities. Finally, status determination under IHL of 
PMSCs’ employees is important to the adversary since the status under IHL 
informs the adversary whether to consider PMSCs’ employees as lawful 
target and attack them lawfully or not.  
 Civilians are not defined separately under IHL. However, since the 
civilians/combatants categories are mutually exclusive, civilians are defined 
negatively. Therefore, all individuals who cannot be considered as 
combatants
158
 and all objects which cannot fit within the definition of 
military objects provided by IHL must be recognized as civilians or 
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civilian
159
. Therefore, I have to start the evaluation by investigating whether 
PMSCs’ employees can be labelled as combatants.  
 
4.2. Status Determination of PMSCs' Employees under IHL 
 
4.2.1. PMSCs as Combatants? 
 
According to GC I-IV and the AP I–II, combatant status can be considered 
either as state of de jure or de facto combatant. The question then breaks 
down into two questions: a) if PMSCs’ employees can be considered as de 
jure combatants through being integrated into the states’ armed forces under 
Article 4A(1) of the GC III or Article 43(3) AP I, and b) if they can be 
recognized as de facto combatants by meeting the conditions for being a 
militia set forth in Article 4A(2) GCIII or Article 43(1) and (2) AP I
160
.  
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In regard to the first case, the integration within the armed forces of a state 
party to the conflict depends upon the decision of the concerned state
161
. In 
regard to the formal integration of the individuals into the armed forces, 
although integration is possible, it would rarely, if ever, happen to the case 
of PMSCs’ employees since it would be against the initiatory purpose of 
outsourcing military-security services. As it has been showed earlier in this 
thesis, contracting PMSCs provides the state with a “flexible instrument to 
handle new technologies and tasks” while keeping financial and political 
costs low
162
. On the contrary, the integration of PMSCs into the national 
army would undo such advantages
163
. Such integration is even more 
unlikely when it comes to the sub-contractors.  
Apart from these strategic, political and financial concerns, the challenge 
remains in regard to the matter of recruitment. It is questionable if a mere 
contract between a state and a PMSC can be qualified as formal integration 
of PMSCs’ employees into the armed forces. If a state wished to formally 
incorporate PMSCs’ employees into its armed forces, it could readily do so. 
However, the mere fact that no formal recruitment has occurred would rule 
this possibility out
164
. Also here, the confusion rises when one deals with the 
practice of sub-contracting. It is unlikely that contractual relationship 
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between the state and the PMSC can expand enough to embrace multi-layer 
sub-contractors. Indeed, if all  PMSC’s employees and their sub-contracted 
employees were integrated into the armed forces of the state, these 
employees would be regarded as equal to the national armed forces and 
there would be no more confusion – neither in respect to their status nor 
their rights and responsibilities
165
. However, as it has been said earlier, 
integration into the armed forces of the state is exactly the opposite of the 
whole point of privatization
166
.  
Returning to the alternative of a de facto combatant status, the question is 
whether PMSCs’ employees can be qualified as combatants on account of 
their acts and by meeting the conditions set forth in Article 4A(2) GC III or 
Article 43 AP I. It should be first noted that there is a crucial difference 
between Article 4A(2) GC III and Art. 43 AP I which might bring different 
consequences once applying to the case of PMSCs. Accordingly, while in 
the GC III “armed forces” are being divided to “militias forming part of the 
armed forces,” on the one hand, and “other militias…and volunteer corps” 
on the other, in Article 43 AP I, such distinction has been abandoned and 
replaced by general reference to “armed forces”. The aim of this revision is 
said to remove the necessity to refer to a State’s domestic law in order to 
determine who is a member of the armed forces and who is not
167
. 
Therefore, assuming that the other requirements of Article 43 are fulfilled, 
the Article was intended to include all groups which have some sort of 
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factual link to the regular armed forces into the definition of “armed 
forces”168. This interpretation is in line with the functional approach taken 
by Article 43(1), being that, whether a group is part of the “armed forces” 
depends primarily on whether the group is fighting on behalf a party to the 
conflict
169
. 
 
Moreover, Article 43(1) provides a lower threshold by requiring that the 
group be “under a command responsible” to a Party to the conflict, whereas 
Article 4A(2) requires that the group can be described as “belonging to a 
Party to the conflict.” The consequence is that it is more likely that a PMSC 
constitutes a State’s “armed forces” within the definition set forth under 
Article 43(1) AP I.
170
 Therefore, depending on which Article being applied, 
there might be different responses to whether PMSCs and their employees 
can be considered as de facto combatants or not. Applying Article 43(1) AP 
I to the case of PMSCs, Katja Weigelt & Frank Marker, for example, 
consider PMSCs’ employees as de facto combatants.  They argue that 
PMSCs not only constitute armed units which are acting on behalf of the 
state due to their contractual relationship, PMSCs also have a command 
responsibility to the state for the conducts of their subordinates through the 
contract. Therefore, PMSCs can be said to be generally subject to some 
form of supervisory direction analogous to command
171
.  
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This position has been, nonetheless, criticized by saying that PMCs would 
probably not fulfill the requirement of being under a responsible command 
of the state party to the conflict. Critics have pointed out to the present 
inability of many States to subject members of a PMC to their criminal 
jurisdiction as an indicator which precludes application of Article 43(1) AP 
I to the case of PMSCs
172
.  
As in regard to the requirement of organizational structure and internal 
disciplinary system, Weigelt & Marker believe PMSCs enjoy at least a 
minimum of internal organizational structure and discipline, considering the 
fact that many employees of PMSCs are former military staff. Finally 
Weigelt & Marker argue that most PMSCs have their own codes of 
conducts which expectedly commit their employees to the rules and 
principles of IHL. In regard to this last condition, namely acting in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war, Weigelt & Marker add that it 
is essential to consider the systematic conduct and policy of the company as 
a whole rather than weighting incidental misconduct of individual 
employees
173
.  
On the other hand, following the definition provided under the GC III, 
Lindsey Cameron concludes that PMSCs’ employees cannot be granted 
combatant status under Article 4A(2) by pointing out two issues. First, she 
raises doubt over the applicability of the opening paragraph which requires 
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that the militia (PMSCs in the present case) must “belong” to a Party of the 
conflict. This, again, brings up the entire challenge of asserting such 
“belonging” relationship to the state. Cameron explains this challenge of 
“independence from the armed forces yet belonging to a party to the 
conflict.” She clarifies: “those PMCs that most probably “belong” to the US 
(in that they carry out services directly for the US forces) lack the 
independence necessary to be considered a separate militia, but remain 
outside the actual armed forces. Those PMCs that enjoy greater 
independence by virtue of the fact that they may be subcontracted by a 
reconstruction agency, on the other hand, are less likely to “belong” to a 
party to the conflict.”174 Further, Cameron notes that the four requirements 
must all be met by the group as a whole. This suspends the applicability of 
the Article to the PMSCs’ employees upon a “company-by-company 
analysis”. As in regard to Iraq, there are many companies operating that act 
differently; some of them wear uniform while some others do not. Even 
those who wear uniform and look very much like the Article 4A(2) forces 
are in fact civilians. These ambiguous situations make it difficult to follow 
the IHL rules
175
. Nonetheless, IHL regulations, as the laws governing the 
situation of war, need to be straightforward. Otherwise, if the laws were 
confusing, combatants would not reasonably be able to follow the rules. As 
Cameron elaborates, “if it is virtually impossible for opposing forces to 
know which PMC employees are accurately perceived as having combatant 
status (and therefore as legitimate military objectives), and which PMC 
employees are civilians and possibly even protected persons (the shooting of 
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whom could constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions), the 
resulting confusion could discourage any attempt to comply with 
humanitarian law.”176 
Finally, by resorting to a teleological interpretation of Article 4A(2), 
Cameron maintains that a categorization of PMSCs’ employees as 
combatants and consequently granting them with the rights of POWs, is at 
odds with the very historical purpose of the Article. Accordingly, the 
historical justification for adaptation of Article 4A(2) was to allow partisans 
in the Second World War to have the POW status.
177
 However, to make an 
equation between those partisans and the current actors in armed conflicts, 
one shall take into account the “resistance” role of those militias. This, in 
turn, makes examples such as “the remnants of defeated armed forces or 
groups seeking to liberate an occupied territory” appear suitable to be 
equalized with those partisans, rather than PMSCs
178
.        
To summarise, it is unlikely that PMSCs’ employees become qualified as 
combatants. Therefore, considering the very binary categorization of 
combatants and civilians under IHL, the question is whether PMSCs’ 
employees are or can be considered as civilians.  
 
4.2.2. PMSCs as Civilians? 
 
Recognition of PMSCs’ employees as holding civilian status has enjoyed 
support among states. This is implied by the two recent documents; a) the 
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Montreux Document, produced by the ICRC in conjunction with seventeen 
governments, and b) the Draft Convention, adopted by the UN Working 
Group. In both documents the position favoured is to grant the PMSCs’ 
employees status as civilians.  There might be just a slight difference 
implied from the language used by each document. In the Montreux 
Document, PMCSs’ employees are presumptively considered as civilians, 
which means that they are protected as civilians unless they fit one of three 
exceptions: a) being incorporated into the regular armed forces of a State, b) 
being members of organised armed forces, groups or units under a 
command responsible to the State, or c) they otherwise lose their protections 
as determined by international humanitarian law, such as taking a DPH
179
. 
Nonetheless, though the UN Working Group has not stipulated the status of 
PMSCs under IHL within the Draft Convention, it has implicitly gone a bit 
further in favouring the civilian status by effectively prohibiting PMSCs’ 
employees from taking a DPH.
180
  
Yet, the recent position to count PMSCs’ employees in the civilian category 
is not out of critics either. It is true that presuming PMSCs’ employees or at 
least vast majority of them, as civilians honours a general IHL presumption 
of favouring the civilian status in case of doubt
181
. However, such 
presumption is over-inclusive in a sense that it fails to address those services 
which involve military operations. Although this status determination seems 
consistent with the way that PMSCs’ and their employees are defined in 
both the Montreaux Document and the Draft Convention, this would not 
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reflect the whole truth of PMSCs since, as is mentioned earlier in this thesis, 
some PMSCs’ and their employees are, indeed, contracted to perform 
combat operations
182. Apart from that, presuming PMSCs’ employees as 
civilians, also, hinges upon the concept of direct participation in hostilities 
(DPH) which brings certain difficulties when applied to the case of PMSCs’ 
employees. This issue will be under scrutiny in the following. 
 
4.3.  Applying the Criterion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
(DPH) to Determine the Status of PMSCs Employees 
 
In order to examine workability of the test of DPH to the case of PMSC’s 
employees, it is necessary to briefly introduce the concept of DPH under 
IHL. Therefore, I dedicated the following part to briefly explain the concept 
of DPH and the practical challenges of using such a concept. 
 
4.3.1. The Concept of DPH and Its Workability in the Case of PMSCs’ 
Employees   
 
As has been discussed earlier in this thesis, status determination brings 
entitlement and determines for the other party to the conflict how to act 
towards other actors. However, in regard to the PMSCs, conditioning the 
status determination to the test of DPH makes it completely ambiguous and 
impractical in the situation of an armed conflict. This is because the 
meaning and scope of direct participation, whether in international or non-
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international armed conflict, is highly ambiguous. There are disagreements 
on what constitutes DPH at all.  
Since there is no uniform and clear definition, whether a civilian is taking a 
DPH has remained a question of the fact which shall be examined in a case-
by-case basis
183
. Relying on a functional approach criteria, the ICRC has 
produced a ninety pages long Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of 
DPH
184
. In an attempt to clarify what constitutes DPH, the ICRC 
Interpretative Guidance has provided ten recommendations to determine 
DPH. However, one may note that the ambiguity and disputability of the 
notion of DPH is evident from the long instruction explaining how to apply 
such recommendations. The Guidance consists of three elements which 
should be satisfied cumulatively in order to qualify an action constituting 
DPH; a) threshold of harm, b) direct causation and c) belligerent nexus.
185
 
As for the first element, activities are considered as DPH when they 
“adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of an 
adversary” as a primarily criterion, or “directly inflict death, injury or 
destruction on persons or objects” as the alternative standard.186 According 
to the second element, there should be a direct causal link between such act 
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and the harm likely to result from it within the hostility.
187
 Finally, it is 
required that such conduct is specifically designed to cause the harm “in 
support of a party to an armed conflict and to the detriment of another”188. 
In applying the last criterion, it is of utmost importance to consider the “one 
causal step” approach to distinguish a “direct” link from the “indirect” 
one.
189
 In addition, to assert a belligerent nexus, it is not enough to be only 
“objectively likely” to directly cause the required threshold of harm, but the 
act must also be “specifically designed” to do so.190  
Applying the concept of DPH to the case of PMSCs’ employees poses 
particular challenges that are the direct result of the fact that PMSCs provide 
increasingly diverse array of functions; functions which, as I have stated 
before, vary from catering and transportation to combat. 
In an attempt to reduce the abstractedness of the concept of DPH in the 
context of PMSCs, the ICRC Interpretative Guidance has attempted to 
provide concrete examples. For example, the Guidance distinguishes 
“between the defence of military personnel and other military objectives 
against enemy attacks (direct participation in hostilities) and the protection 
of those same persons and objects against crime or violence unrelated to the 
hostilities (law enforcement/defence of self or others).
191” Also, the 
Guidance lists examples of acts which shall not be qualified as DPH, such 
as collection of intelligence of a non-tactical nature or purchasing, 
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smuggling, manufacturing, or maintaining weapons and equipment outside 
specific military operations
192
.  
Similarly, the Montreux Document entails some examples illustrating what 
constitutes direct participation within the context of PMSCs’ operations and 
what falls outside of DPH. For example, guarding military bases against 
attacks from the enemy party, gathering tactical military intelligence, and 
operating weapons systems in a combat operation shall be recognized as 
DPH
193
 whereas equipment maintenance, logistic services, guarding 
diplomatic missions or other civilian sites, or catering would not constitute 
DPH
194
.  
Yet, these neat clear cuts provided by ICRC Interpretative Guidance and the 
Montreux Document would appear less accurate in practice. This is because 
the thin lines between direct participation and indirect participation in 
hostilities would break down by the change of the circumstances. For 
example, in regard to the example of the collecting intelligence the question 
remains where the line between tactical and non-tactical intelligence should 
be drawn
195
. Instead, taking a DPH should be examined on a case-by-case 
basis taking into consideration the nature of the operation together with the 
status of the individuals or the capacities within which they operate
196
. 
The other problem with applying the concept of DPH to the case of PMSCs 
and their employees is posed by the lack of distinction between offensive 
and defensive attacks under IHL. Accordingly, Article 49.1 of Protocol I 
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defines “attacks” broadly to include “acts of violence against the adversary, 
whether in offence or in defence.” This negligence about the fact that IHL is 
neutral in regard the purpose of the attack nullifies arguments seeking to 
exclude acts of violence taken place in defence from the acts that constitute 
DPH
197
. Therefore, given the fact that fighting to attack and fighting to 
defend are insignificant distinctions within IHL, distinguishing affirmative 
participations of PMSCs’ employees in hostilities from the harmful 
conducts undertaken following their defensive engagements does not 
contribute to unlock the problems of applying the notion of DPH
198
. 
Further, the workability of the notion of DPH in the case of PMSCs and 
their employees might appear difficult due to the fact that there is no set list 
of lawful targets. Rather, objects can become lawful targets according to 
their nature, location, purpose or use
199
. Then, the question would remain, 
for example, as to whether a PMSC’s employee guarding a civilian building 
would continue to have the same status despite the fact that the building 
suddenly becomes a lawful target without the PMSC’s employee being 
aware of the change; would he or she be a civilian unlawfully participating 
in hostilities then? Or vice versa, what if the object ceases to be used for 
military purposes and he or she still continues to guard it? Does he or she 
then cease to take DPH? Further, how can an adversary be reasonably 
expected to identify such a change in status and take it into account?
200
 
Yet another difficulty in regard to the concept of DPH is the temporal 
problem. The earliest example of the temporal challenge is the on/off duty 
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contractors guarding military infrastructures; while the on duty contractors 
may be recognized as taking DPH, that is not the case in regard to the off 
duty contractors. This situation causes a problem known as the “revolving 
door”. This refers to the fact that the person’s status and consequently, his or 
her rights and responsibilities switch in a regular basis by the end of his or 
her working shift
201
. Therefore, considering the example of intelligence 
gathering once again, it is unclear if the temporal variable is decisive or not; 
What if that intelligence was not tactically useful initially but became 
tactically useful later?  
Therefore, what is problematic in regard to application of the concept of 
DPH to the case of PMSCs and their employees is tied to the 
indeterminacies which starts from the very “general nature of the activity 
(e.g., what kind of intelligence gathering? Guarding what kind of building?), 
to the specific circumstances of any given instance (e.g., on duty or off? 
specific combat operation or not?).”202 
Yet, the challenges in regard to the workability of the concept of DPH, 
becomes more complicated once one notes the correlations between the 
political decision of the state party to the conflict and the interpretation 
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which the state would apply. This is a question of who should make the 
evaluation in each single case. In absence of a uniform understanding of 
DPH, different states may adopt different interpretations of the term. In the 
following, I am touching upon the example of US in approaching the 
concept of DPH. I will finally, conclude how indeterminacy and instability 
of the concept of DPH makes it improper to be tied to status determination 
of PMSCs’ employees.  
 
4.3.2. US Interpretation of DPH and Its Implications for the Status 
of PMSCs’ Employees 
 
Unlike the ICRC’s functional approach, the US have persuaded a 
membership approach which hinges upon a broader interpretation of DPH in 
line with its counterterrorism operations.  
A broad interpretation of DPH prevented the Reagan administration from 
ratifying AP I since it would grant too much protection to irregular forces 
and would, consequently, make it more difficult to lawfully target some 
organized terrorist armed groups
203
. This logic, later in regard to ratifying 
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AP II, led the US government to declare its broader interpretation of the 
protocol
204
.  
Following the September 11
th
 attack of 2001, and the introduction of Global 
War on the Terrorism, the Bush administration introduced a new category of 
“unlawful enemy combatant” within the traditional binary categorization of 
combatant and civilian under the laws of war. Explaining this new category 
is essential to understand the US interpretative approach concerning DPH. 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) defined “unlawful enemy 
combatant” in part as “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or 
its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person 
who is part of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or associated forces).
205” This new 
category not only allowed the US to lawfully target members of qualified 
organized armed groups without granting them the rights and privileges of 
POW’s when captured, but also served the US as a conceptual instrument to 
broaden the scope of DPH further. Therefore, individuals who would 
otherwise be considered as non-combatants in case of a war against the US, 
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such as financiers, propagandists, or accountants, are recognized as unlawful 
enemy combatants and left with the least protections: the same as a civilian 
who takes DPH
206
.  
The Obama Administration, in its Memorandum Regarding the 
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at 
Guantanamo Bay, has followed the same broad interpretation
207
. This broad 
interpretation favours an “affirmative disengagement approach” according 
to which known members of an armed group can be targeted at any time, 
and it is the civilians’ own responsibility to demonstrate their affirmative 
disengagement from an armed group.
208
 Thus, although the Obama 
Administration has abandoned using the terminology of “unlawful enemy 
combatant”, the Obama Administration still maintains a broad interpretation 
of “being a member of an armed group”. This includes persons 
“substantially supporting” or “in association with” the terrorist groups. 
However, it has not been clarified how “substantial support” should be 
interpreted.
209
 This loose language, in turn, has made the government 
develop its own interpretation of DPH by shifting the standard of directly 
participating in the hostilities to the standard of “directly supporting 
hostilities”210.  
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The whole of these ambiguities add to the initial difficulties in respect to the 
workability of the concept of DPH.  
 
4.4. Conclusion: 
 
To conclude, confusion surrounding the placement of PMSCs and their 
employees within the binary distinction of civilian and combatant under 
IHL has made scholars resort to the concept of DPH as an instrument to 
determine the status of these companies and their employees under IHL. 
However, as I tried to show earlier, disagreements about what constitute 
DPH and the difficulties surrounding the whole concept of DPH makes it 
unworkable to apply the concept to the case of PMSCs. Suspending status 
determination upon such indeterminacies would be inconsistent with the 
doctrine and purpose of IHL as to provide straight forward rules which can 
be reasonably expected to be followed in the complex situation of armed 
conflict. These difficulties, in turn, indicate how uncomfortable it is to place 
PMSCs and their employees within the binary distinction of civilian and 
combatant under IHL. This can be one indication of a challenge of adapting 
IHL to understand a new form of privately organized violence and to 
accommodate this private face of organized violence within the system of 
public territorial state, recognized and constituted by IL
211
. This challenge 
also informs a dilemma of IHL to provide a new and more complex 
understanding of the relationship between public and private that can bring 
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broader implications for IL as a whole. To shed light on the relationship 
between PMSCs and States, I will investigate the state responsibility in 
regard to the wrongful acts committed by the PMSCs’ employees and sub-
contractors in the following section. 
 
*** 
 
5. PMSCs and Their Relations to State Actors, The Challenge of 
Attribution: 
 
5.1. Overview to the Discourse of State Responsibility; An Inquiry to 
the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful: 
 
States are responsible for their breaches of their obligations under IL. The 
responsibility of states in this regard is derived from guidelines incorporated 
in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles) developed by the International Law 
Commission, adopted in 2001
212
. Accordingly, states are responsible for a 
wrongful act if a) the act constitutes a breach of an international obligation, 
and b) if it is attributable to the state
213
. Although proving the mere fact of 
occurrence of a breach of an international obligation has its own challenges, 
what appears peculiar in respect to the case of PMSCs is to attribute the 
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conduct of a private enterprise to the State. In this sense, Article 4 of the 
Draft Articles addresses the responsibility of the state for the conduct of its 
organs. According to Art. 4: 
“1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an 
act of that State under  international law, whether the organ 
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other  
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of 
the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central government or of a territorial unit of the State.  
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that 
status in accordance with the internal law of the State.” 
 
Article 5 follows to raise state responsibility in regard to the conduct of 
persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority, providing 
that:  
“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an 
organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international 
law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance.”  
What is implied from the above Articles is that, considering the link 
between a normal soldier and the state, the probability that state holds 
responsibility for the conduct of a soldier is much more than cases wherein 
 68 
the wrongful act is committed by the PMSCs’ employees and sub-
contractors. Presuming that the occurrence of the wrongful act has been 
already proved, it would suffice to show that the person in question was 
indeed a soldier of that state in order to raise the issue of state 
responsibility
214
. Moreover, reading Art. 4, 5 and 7 of the Draft Articles in 
conjunction with customary international law expressed in Article 3 of the 
fourth Hague Convention of 1907 (HC IV), and Article 91 of Additional 
Protocol I, it would not even make any difference whether the soldier 
exceeded his or her authority, contravened instructions or even did not act in 
his or her capacity as a soldier.
215
 
However, applying the rule set forth in Art. 4 and 5 of the Draft Articles in 
the case of PMSCs’ employees and their sub-contractors has appeared more 
complicated. Unlike the normal soldiers, in order to attribute the acts 
committed by PMSCs’ employees to the state, one needs to conduct a more 
complex factual inquiry
216
. This is because PMSCs and their employees are 
per se private entities supposedly acting independent from state. Of course 
such state of independency differs from one PMSC to another, depending on 
the nature of their functions. For example, PMSCs’ employees who perform 
as interrogators seem to be closely bound to the state. Thanks to such close 
bound it would be more probable for a state to become responsible for the 
acts of these PMSCs’ employees217. On the other hand, when it comes to 
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sub-contractors, attributing a responsibility to states appears more difficult 
because of the sub-contractors’ distance and independence from states. This 
was the case in respect to the abuses taken place at the Abu-Ghraib prison. 
Accordingly, while misconducts were traced to civilian contractors acting as 
interpreters and interrogators, both the state actor and the concerned PMSCs 
could distance themselves from responsibility by asserting that those 
individuals were actually working for a sub-contractor and the conduct of 
employees of a sub-contractor could not be attributed to the state in 
question
218
.    
Apart from sub-contractors, PMSCs providing other services, such as 
personal security, enjoy more independence from states in operating their 
plans. The relationship between the state and PMSCs’ contracted by them is 
a kind of coordination rather than subordination
219
. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that in order to raise state responsibility for misconducts 
committed by a majority of the PMSCs’ employees under the Draft Articles, 
there should be additional factual links, when compared to what needs to be 
proven in regards to the conduct of regular soldiers. In regard to the 
application of the Article 4, the factual link would contribute to establish of 
the attribution link by considering PMSCs’ employees as de facto organs of 
the government
220
. Further, PMSCs contracted by the state to exercise an 
element of governmental authority, namely security and military functions, 
and PMSCs licensed by the state to operate such services could be subjected 
to Art. 5 of the Draft Articles. To apply Article 5 it has to be proved that the 
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conduct happened, it was empowered by law, and additionally that the 
person acted in the governmental capacity. 
Yet, even if such additional factual link was asserted, applying Article 4 and 
5 in conjunction with Art. 7 would restrict state responsibility only to those 
situations wherein the person concerned acted in the governmental capacity 
and only in those particular instances
221
. This, in turn, opens up a gap in 
regard to the responsibility of state for the off-duty conducts of a PMSCs’ 
employee.  
Finally, the conduct of PMSCs’ employees can be attributed to the state 
under Art. 8 of the Draft Articles. Article 8 refers to situations when the 
perpetrator acts on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of a 
state. Yet, the state would not hold unqualified responsibility under this 
provision, which means that the responsibility may rise only if the conduct 
was committed in compliance with the orders given by the State. Put it in 
other words, conduct contrary to orders or beyond the control of the state 
excludes state responsibility. However, this is not the case most of the times 
because a) the independency of private contractors in planning and 
operation often leaves little room for states to exercise adequate physical 
control over them, especially in regard to mobile services, and b) the lack of 
clarity in the rules of engagement and the confidential nature of such 
arrangements would make it difficult to prove the conduct was committed in 
compliance with the orders given by the State, even if the violation was 
actually put on the agenda by the State itself
222
. 
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Thus, unless state actors incorporate PMSCs’ employees into their own 
armed forces, or PMSCs’ employees would be considered as exercising 
elements of governmental authority, the possibility to raise state 
responsibility for the acts committed by PMSCs are much more narrow 
comparing to that of the regular soldiers
223
. To conclude, the responsibility 
gap remains in regard to both the off-duty conduct of PMSC’s employees 
and the acts performed ultra vires
224
. To overcome such a difficulty in 
regard to the employees’ conducts, it has been suggested that more 
emphasize should be put on the positive obligation of states under IHL
225
. 
The positive obligations of state are addressed as the general duty to “ensure 
respect”226 for IHL. Following the obligation to “ensure respect”, states are 
required to undertake due diligence in fulfilling general duties to vet, train, 
instruct, and report, and possibly to prevent known ongoing violations in all 
kinds of armed conflicts (both IAC and NIAC)
227
. In respect to IACs other 
specific regulations might subject the state to further due diligence 
obligations, in addition to the general duties. For example, Article 27 of GC 
IV, containing basic guarantees for the protection of civilians, could cover 
the case of PMSC’s employees in a sense that states would have the 
obligation to exercise due diligence and adequately protect the civilians, no 
                                                                                                                            
to market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007, p. 139. 
223
 Hoppe, supra note 216, p. 992. 
224
 Ibid., p. 1012. 
225 Ibid., p. 992. Also, Rule 144 Customary Rule of IHL, in, Henckaerts, & Doswald-
Beck, supra note 107, “Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes: 
States may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an 
armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of 
international humanitarian law.” 
226
 Article 1 GC IV- Article 1(4) AP I (known as common Article 1) 
227
 Hoppe, supra note 216, p. 1012. 
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matter if the violator is a regular soldier or PMSC employee performing 
either on-duty or off-duty
228
.  
Similarly, the protection provided to POWs by Article 12 GC III imposes 
the ultimate responsibility on the Detaining Power in regard to the treatment 
given to POWs.
229
 Moreover, leaving PMSCs employees in charge of POW-
camps with no military oversight would be considered as a violation of IHL 
by the state.
230
 
In regard to occupations, states may be held responsible for the conduct of 
PMSCs’ and their employees  providing coercive services, even if they are 
acting off-duty, provided that the contracting state fails to ensure respect for 
the its obligations under IHL in its supervision of PMSCs’ employees.231 
In NIACs, establishing the attribution appears to be more difficult since no 
specific article goes beyond the rules of attribution. Therefore, states may be 
responsible only in regard to a general duty to vet, train, instruct, and report, 
and possibly to prevent known on going violations in NIACs.
232
 
 
Nonetheless, there is no consensus on the nature and scope of this 
responsibility to “ensure respect” for IHL. There have been doubts whether 
                                                 
228
 “Art. 27. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, 
their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners 
and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially 
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a State could incur international responsibility under IHL for a failure to 
exercise due diligence at all
233
. 
 
5.2. The Question of State Responsibility for the Acts Conducted by 
PMSCs’ Employees: Looking for Alternative Limbs for the Attribution 
Test 
 
5.2.1. The Montreux Document: 
 
For further attempts to discover the relationship between states and PMSCs, 
the Montreux Document can serve as a guideline mapping state 
responsibility. The Montreux Document is the result of a joint initiative by 
the government of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross launched in early 2006. The Document is not a new convention and it 
is not binding by itself. Rather, it recalls existing legal obligations of states, 
PMSCs and their employees operating in situations of armed conflict
234
. The 
Montreux Document contains 73 good practices to guide state how to 
comply with their obligations through a series of legislative and 
administrative measures. Montreaux Document recognizes three kinds of 
states, namely; contracting states (countries that hire PMSCs), territorial 
states (countries on whose territory PMSCs operate) and home states 
(countries in which PMSCs are based). Responsibility would assign to any 
or all of these states if they fail their legal obligation to oversee and control 
the conduct of PMSCs and their employees. Accordingly, states are required 
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to exercise due diligence to ensure that IHL is respected. This could be 
realized, for example, through establishing transparent licensing regimes so 
that only reputable companies would be allowed in armed conflict 
environments. Moreover, states are advised to maintain a proper staff 
vetting procedure, to educate employees on IHL and HRL and to set up 
standard operating procedures and clear rules of engagement that comply 
with the law. This is how states could control the internal disciplines and 
procedures of PMSCs.  
According to Montreux Document, contracting PMSCs to perform certain 
activities would not release the contracting state from their obligation under 
IL.
235
 Montreux Document also prohibits contracting out tasks that are 
explicitly assigned to a State agent or authority under the regime of IHL; 
such as “exercising the power of the responsible officer over prisoner of war 
camps or places of internment of civilians in accordance with the Geneva 
Conventions.”236 As the Montreux Document, further, emphasizes on 
positive obligation to ensure respect for IHL, it requires states to adopt 
appropriate legislative, judiciary and administrative means in order to ensure 
the respect for IHL by PMSCs
237
.  
Nonetheless, Montreaux Document still follows the traditional rule of 
customary international law that I discussed earlier to attribute the conduct 
of PMSCs’ employees to state and raise the state responsibility238.  
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To overcome this challenge of attribution, the Draft Convention has 
appeared more innovative in its orientation toward the relationship between 
states and PMSCs and state responsibility for misconducts of PMSCs’ 
employees as it will no longer be necessary to prove “attribution” or 
“subordination”. This innovative framework is discussed in the following.  
 
5.2.2. Draft Convention: 
 
As a response to the regulatory gap mentioned earlier in this thesis, the 
Draft Convention was adopted to fill the “important gaps … in national and 
international legal regimes applicable to private military and security 
companies”.239  
To explore the state responsibility regarding the activities of PMSCs and 
their employees, the Draft Convention considers four categories of states, 
namely the contracting states, states of operation, home states and third 
states
240
. Although the responsibility is accordingly assigned to these 
categorisations, most aspects of responsibility under the Draft Convention 
overlap. The Draft Convention, further, provides a framework through 
which state responsibility, at least in regard to certain acts of PMSCs and 
their employees would not necessarily depend upon satisfying the traditional 
                                                                                                                            
State into their regular armed forces in accordance with its domestic legislation; b) 
members of organized armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the 
State; c) empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority if they are acting in 
that capacity (i.e. are formally authorized by law or regulation to carry out functions 
normally conducted by organs of the State); or d) in fact acting on the instructions of the 
State (i.e. the State has specifically instructed the private actor’s conduct) or under its 
direction or control (i.e. actual exercise of effective control by the State over a private 
actor’s conduct).” 
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240
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rules of “attribution” or “subordination” under international law. According 
to Article 4(1), states will still bear responsibility “for military and security 
activities of PMSCs registered or operating in their jurisdiction, whether or 
not these entities are contracted by the state”. Moreover, under Article 5 (1) 
and 7, states are required to take measures to ensure that PMSCs respect and 
observe human rights and that their conduct is consistent with IHL. This 
framework brings significant implications for both state actors and PMSCs 
and how they relate to each others. For example, one can consider the 
AEGIS Defence Services Ltd, a British company that secretly relocated its 
offices to Basel, Switzerland, in October 2010.
241
 The company is owned by 
Tim Spencer, the man behind the infamous Sandline operations in Sierra 
Leone at the height of the civil war in that country. AEGIS has been able to 
attract contracts from the US government for services in Afghanistan and 
Iraq while it is also extending its network to Africa. However, just for the 
purposes of our analysis, if Switzerland were a state party to the Draft 
Convention it would have to license and register the company under its 
domestic regime and also bear responsibility for the military and security 
activity of AEGIS all over the world. This alone would have acted as an 
important detriment for Switzerland to allow rouge companies such as 
AEGIS to operate within its territory
242
. 
Positive obligations of the state in regard to conduct of PMSCs also reach 
the point that states are required to establish jurisdiction over criminal 
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conducts committed by PMSCs and their employees
243
 and take measures 
necessary for investigation, prosecution and punishment of violations of the 
Draft Convention
244
. 
Besides establishing these general obligations, the Draft Convention 
distinguishes the “inherent” state functions as functions, which cannot be 
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offences referred to in article 19 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the 
proceedings.” 
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delegated and the state maintains direct responsibility for them, from other 
type of services
245
. Following this logic, states are demanded to ensure such 
distinction is respected by contractors or through agreements that they enter 
into with PMSCs and that the PMSCs’ employees respect the law246. 
Specifically in regard to the use of force, States are required to take 
measures to prohibit PMSCs’s employees from taking DPH or other acts 
that may result in overthrowing governments, changing internationally 
recognised borders, violating the sovereignty of states or any part thereof 
and explicitly targeting civilians
247
. Considering that the Draft Convention 
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industrial infrastructure, and to objects of historical and cultural importance.”  
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 Article 8 of the Draft Convention reads as; 
“1. Each State party shall take such legislative, administrative and other measures as may 
be necessary to prohibit and make illegal the direct participation of PMSCs and their 
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does not provide any definition for DPH, one has to refer to general 
definition of DPH under IHL which was discussed earlier.  
In order to give effect to these obligations, the Draft Convention has 
designed three pillars which include “legislative intervention, institution-
building and a procedural framework” through which state can exercise 
adequate monitoring and oversights over the conducts of PMSCs
248
. 
The framework provided by the Draft Convention is certainly a significant 
effort to regulate PMSCs and, therefore, to close the regulatory gaps that 
would let states pick and choose which international regimes to abide by 
when dealing with PMSCs
249
. Nonetheless, it is still not very enlightening in 
                                                                                                                            
personnel in hostilities, terrorist acts and military actions aimed at, or which States have 
grounds for suspecting would result in: 
(a) The overthrow of a Government (including regime change by force) or undermining of 
the constitutional order, or the legal, economic and financial bases of the State; 
(b) The coercive change of internationally acknowledged borders of the State; 
(c) The violation of sovereignty, or support of foreign occupation of a part or the whole 
territory of State; 
(d) Explicitly targeting civilians or causing disproportionate harm, including but not 
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(i) Assaults on the life and security of civilians; 
(ii) The coercive removal or displacement of people from areas of permanent or habitual 
residence; 
(iii) Limits to the freedom of movement of civilians; and 
(iv) Restriction in access to resources and means of livelihood, including but not limited to 
water, food, land, livestock, shelter, and access to sacred sites and places of worship. 
2. Each State party shall ensure that the activities of PMSCs and their personnel do not 
cause or exacerbate inter- or intra-State warfare or conflict; 
3. Each State party shall ensure that PMSCs and their personnel do not provide training that 
could facilitate its clients’ direct participation in hostilities, terrorist acts or military actions, 
when these actions are aimed at the results defined in article 8.1.”  
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understanding the status of PMSCs and their employees in relation to the 
state actor and in placing them within the broader framework of IHL and IL. 
 
5.3. Conclusion: 
 
Talking of legal challenges made by PMSCs and their employees to 
application of the IL and IHL, one has to look into the issue of state 
responsibility for the acts conducted by PMSCs’ employees. This is mostly 
a question of attribution through which I was trying to see the relationship 
between PMSCs and their employees with state actors. To answer this 
question, I walked through the relevant laws on responsibility of state under 
IL. Considering the 2001 Draft Articles, I indicated that unless state actors 
incorporate PMSCs’ employees into their own armed forces, or contractors 
would be considered as exercising elements of governmental authority, the 
possibility to raise state responsibility for the acts committed by PMSCs are 
much narrower comparing to that of the regular soldiers
250
. The 
responsibility gap, therefore, remains in regard to both the off-duty conduct 
of contractors and the acts performed ultra vires.   
To fulfil the responsibility gap, it is suggested that to put more emphasizes 
on positive obligations of state under IHL. I discussed this positive 
obligation as general duty to “ensure respect”251 for IHL in both IACs and 
NIACs.  
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With the similar purpose of finding the links between PMSCs and their 
employees and the state actors, I made an inquiry to more recent efforts to 
regulate PMSCs, namely Montreux Document and the Draft Convention. I 
tried to uncover how these documents have established more elaborated 
grounds for considering state responsibility for the misconducts of PMSCs 
employees. As I indicated, the both documents mostly develop on the 
positive responsibility of state actors to ensure respect for IHL.  
Disregarding the difficulties of enforcing such positive obligations, these 
initiatives of course are valuable efforts to fill the regulatory gap under IHL 
and IL in regard to the activities of PMSCs. However, none of these 
documents helps to understand the status of PMSCs and their employees in 
relation to the state actor and within the broader context of IL.  Considering 
this chapter together with the previous one, I conclude that confusion 
regarding the issue of attribution raises as we cannot be sure how to define 
the status of PMSCs and their employees in relation to the states. PMSCs 
are private actors undertaking what has been in the preserve of public actors 
within the state-centric system of IL for a long time. This confusion shakes 
our understanding of how to imagine public and private and how to define 
their relationship under IL. To uncover this oddness, I dedicated the last 
chapter of this thesis to investigate challenges to state-centrism and 
sovereignty made by organization of private violence in the form of PMSCs. 
 
*** 
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6. PMSCs, Challenges to State-centric Paradigm and Its Broader 
Implications for IL 
 
6.1. Overview: 
 
When considering PMSCs in the context of IL it seems that the existence of 
these companies is at odds with the very principle of IL, namely state-
centrism and sovereignty. This challenge can be investigated on two 
accounts: a) in respect to weak states, by which I mean the states that fail to 
provide physical security for their own citizens by establishing functioning 
law and order institutions, and b) in respect to efficient states, by which I 
refer to states that have functional law and order institutions and are 
generally capable of enforcing a coercive monopoly on force while adhering 
to democratic standards.
252
. In respect to the weak states, PMSCs challenge 
the ascendancy of the nation state by undertaking “military and security-
related expertise which [at least previously] were considered the preserve of 
the state, i.e., services that only the state, through its armed forces and law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, could legally and legitimately 
provide”253. Further, in regard to efficient states, the lack of transparency, 
oversight and accountability over the exercise of use of force would be 
problematic.  
 
6.2.Challenges to the Weak State: 
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The use of private sector in provision of security and military services 
within a territory is generally and initially considered as symptomatic 
weakness of the territorial state. This appears as a public demonstration of 
incapacity of the state since if states were able to establish efficient 
institutions as well as legal and practical infrastructures to provide stability 
and physical security for their own citizens they would not resort to external 
actors to fulfil such tasks.
254
 However, contracting out the tasks preserved in 
the governmental domain to be undertaken by PMSCs may not provide a 
solution to state incapacity. But also, it may eventually endanger the state 
sovereignty by “establishment of parallel of “shadow” structures of power 
and authority”255. That would especially be the case when PMSCs are used 
by external actors in order to bring stability and security into the conflict 
region. In that case, there is the risk of marginalizing of the weak state since 
one of the most important sources of authority, namely use of physical 
force, would be placed in disposal of outsiders which would eventually push 
the state farther from its political content in both national and international 
context
256
.  
Furthermore, the use of PMSCs poses challenge to the conventional 
understanding of the governmental effectiveness in the weak state by 
departing from equal distribution of the security-military services to all 
citizens as public goods. This means that security-military functions appear 
to be commoditized in free market which consequently, causes the security 
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becomes conditioned on the individuals’ affordability and access to 
financial resources
257
.  
In another word, the very core tasks of government which was 
conventionally defined as the protection of citizens by monopolized use of 
physical force and at the same time was considered to form the basic 
requirement for an entity to be recognized as the state can now be bought 
and sold independently of the state and on a free, open and competitive 
market. Considering the fact that the weak state lacks adequate legal 
infrastructure and institutional capacity to apply effective control over such 
private transactions either
258
, the state of weakness and inefficiency would 
be then perpetuated by commodifying the military-security tasks and the 
occasional use of force.  
 
6.3.Challenges to the Efficient State: 
  
As it was mentioned earlier, although the challenges made to the said 
conventional concept of statehood and sovereignty seems more evident in 
respect to the weak state, it would still remain present in regard to the 
efficient state as well. From the stand point of the efficient state what makes 
flaw in the test of the “effective government” is the lack of control and 
adequate oversight over the military-security tasks which are contracted out 
to the PMSCs. This is more evident in cases wherein PMSCs are being hired 
to operate abroad. The issue of oversight and supervision appears more 
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problematic to apply in situation of sub-contracting; especially wherein the 
involvement of network of sub-contracting makes a fusion. 
Although there are guidelines and rules of engagements regarding military-
security tasks shouldered by PMSCs, the subjectivity of interpretation, 
insufficiency of details and shortcomings in updating those guidelines might 
cause some divergence from the initially envisaged stipulations
259
.  
In addition, the peculiar challenge of conducting control over what PMSCs 
do is associated with the insecure environment wherein the companies 
mostly operate
260
.  The high insecurity and instability surrounding the 
conflict regions open the floor for the “situational-demanded acts” of 
PMSCs’ employees to happen more frequently261. Such situational-
demanded acts are currently being normalized through what is called the 
private military-security “mission creep”262 which refers to the expansion of 
the project beyond its original goals. To see concrete examples of the lack of 
control in this context, one may consider the case of Iraq war and companies 
operating in there. For example, the US private security company DynCorp 
was hired by the State Department to provide 1000 advisers to contribute 
organizing Iraqi law enforcement and criminal justice systems
263
. However, 
later it was revealed that four DynCorp employees were involved in raids 
conducted by Iraqi police to the home and offices of former exile leader 
Ahmed Chalabi. In those incidents, it was revealed that despite an initial 
restriction on wearing arms, concerned employees were not only armed 
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equipped, but also were effectively directing the raids. This manifested how 
the employees went beyond their official mandate due to lack of 
oversight.
264
 
Also, to provide an example associated with the fusion caused by the 
practice of sub-contracting one may refer to the case of abuses taken place 
at Abu Ghraib prison. According to an internal Army report, the 
involvement of civilian interpreters and interrogators contracted by CACI 
International and Titan Corp. can be traced in those incidents along side 
with the military forces. The report concludes that these employees were 
either directly or indirectly responsible for abuses taken place at Abu Ghraib 
prison. However, confusion made by layers of sub-contracts helped both 
companies to distance themselves from those individuals. Accordingly, 
CACI asserted that “the individuals in question were no longer 
employees”265 and Titan claimed that the individuals involved in those 
incidents were actually working for a sub-contractor
266
.In both these cases, 
the climate of secrecy and lack of transparency make it difficult to 
understand what is really going on within the company. This, consequently, 
would bring challenges regarding supervision and oversight which means 
there would be no efficient way to follow if the PMSC is performing as it 
was originally agreed or not. Considering the enormous reliance upon the 
private contractors in conflict regions like Iraq and Afghanistan, loosing the 
track of effective control over the outsourced military-security tasks may 
threaten the performance of the state in furthering its goals and policies. For 
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example, if PMSCs mandating to provide soldiers with supportive services 
in conflict zones give up the mandate or malfunction, the efficiency and 
security of the state’s own armed forces would be put in jeopardy267. Apart 
from that, to refer to another example one may consider cases where the 
prospect of lack of oversight upon what is going on within the PMS industry 
would result in the depletion of state resource in market conditions
268
. This 
would happen when the state has inadequate control over salaries or other 
employment conditions followed in the private sector to be able compete to 
absorb or maintain highly trained individuals at state service which may 
eventually confront the state with a “brain drain” in this field269. 
 
6.4. PMSCs, the Private Face of Organized Violence, and the 
Implications for IL 
  
Going through the previous section, it seems that the idea of sovereignty and 
state-centrism has been challenged by the rise of PMSCs being allowed to 
carry out traditional state tasks, without a state responsibility being firmly 
established in relation to these activities
270
. This, in turn, seems to force IL 
to confront with a dilemma in addressing a number of issues raised by the 
existence and expansion of PMSCs. More specifically in regard to the laws 
of war, such inconsistency, in addition to ambiguous character of these 
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PMSCs, has caused difficulties as to how to determine the status of PMSCs 
and their employees under IHL and how to define their relationships to 
states. IHL aims to identify persons as either combatants or as civilians, and 
consequently distribute responsibilities and protection according to the 
category the person in question falls into. This is of course an artificial 
binary categorization construed by law. PMSCs and their personnel have 
made this fundamental binary categorization of civilian-combatant to appear 
uncomfortably artificial.   
This self-challenge may emanate from a gradual transition from the 
conventional understanding of the state, as explained above, to a submission 
of IL to an alternative understanding of the state; an alternative 
understanding of the state which does not match the state-centric paradigm 
of IL, as the realist model of international politics advocates for. What the 
self-challenge really consists of is that despite such inconsistency with the 
paradigm of state-centrism, efforts have been taken to accommodate PMSCs 
and their employees within the taxonomy of IHL before revising the 
underlying assumptions of statehood and sovereignty under IL. If private 
actors like PMSCs are going to be logically accommodated within the IL, 
one should admit that the conception of the state has evolved in a sense that 
allows private actors to enter into contracts with state-actors to perform 
tasks that were previously considered as core requirements for governmental 
effectiveness. States as the primary unit of authority under IL, as well as the 
dominant actors using IL as instrument for its own interests, have called 
upon PMSCs as non-state actors to undertake the core tasks of states. This, 
therefore, can be translated as a call to go beyond state-centrism as well as a 
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dilution of the state and rhetoric of sovereignty. When states recognize 
private actors, such as in the case of PMSCs, as capable of legitimately 
entering into contracts with states and international organizations, the very 
same states which benefits from arguing a state-centrism provide a basis 
from which non-state actors within IL benefits. 
 
*** 
 
7. Concluding Words: 
 
The international legal system has weathered sweeping changes over the last 
decades, for new participants have emerged. I have concentrated on the case 
of Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) in my thesis to explain the 
rise of PMSCs as a new phenomenon and evaluate the conceptual and 
practical capacity of IHL in accommodating these new non-state actors. I 
have also tried to uncover how IHL -as a system traditionally regulating 
violence between states and/or organized armed groups that shared many of 
the territorial, administrative and “public” characteristics of states- deals 
with this new, private face of organized violence
271
. I have indicated that 
although it is possible to extend the rules of IHL to accommodate PMSCs, it 
will stretch the skin of IL so thin that it might eventually break. I have tried 
to indicate some of these challenges by touching upon the difficulties about 
status determination and accountability when it comes to the case of PMSCs 
and their employees. I have showed that although there are conceptual legal 
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answers to these difficulties, they are often not easy to discern – particularly 
for military commanders and other combatants who confront severe time 
and expertise constraints. These practical difficulties might ultimately risk 
the very principles of IHL- like distinction- to collapse
272
. 
Going through that path, what I would suggest as basis for further research 
is that certain changes in the jus in bello to accommodate PMSCs may 
inform of broader hidden shifts in configuring the relationship between the 
public and private realms in international society
273
. Considering PMSCs 
and the way that states have treated them in international politics may help 
us to “re-imagine the real” and to reconsider dominant conceptual 
paradigms (of statehood, legitimacy, balance of power between public and 
private authority in international society and humanitarianism).
274
 Such 
further researches would be more impressionistic of course; the same as an 
impressionist sketch, such research would be an attempt to depict a sense of 
the whole instead of depicting the details. However, such oversight seems to 
be necessary to indicate the evolution of dominant conceptual paradigms 
within IL, especially when it comes to non-state actors and their legal 
personality under IL and its broader implications for IL.  
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